There is a general perception that the large trading volume in initial public offerings is mostly due to "flippers" that are allocated shares in the offering and immediately resell them. On average, however, flipping accounts for only 19% of trading volume and 15% of shares offered during the first two days of trading. Institutions do more flipping than retail customers and hot IPOs are flipped much more than cold IPOs. Institutions do not quickly flip cold IPOs to take advantage of price support activities by the underwriter. Explicit penalty bids are rarely assessed against flippers.
Introduction
The stock price performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) has long been a puzzle and researchers are still trying to understand the price behavior of these offerings.
1 On average, IPOs jump up in price considerably on the first day of trading and provide excess returns to investors who are able to buy at the initial offer price and sell immediately in the secondary market.
Recent literature examines the activities of underwriters in the aftermarket. 2 These activities are generally referred to as stabilization activities because they provide price support for weak offerings that tend to trade at or below their offer price. Stabalization activities include exercise of the overallotment option, short covering in the aftermarket, and the use of penalty bids to restrict flipping.
This paper integrates the literature on underpricing of IPOs and aftermarket activities.
The initial stock price performance of IPOs partly depends on how shares are priced, how they are allocated, and what investors do with these shares. Investment banks have the discretion to allocate IPO shares, and investors have the option to hold onto their allocated shares or to sell 1 See Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991) for short-run and long-run performance.
2 For example, see Aggarwal (2000) , Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) , Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) , Benveniste and Busaba (1997) , Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) , Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) , Logue, Rogalski, Seward, and Foster-Johnson (2002) , Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996) , Hanley, Lee, and Seguin (1996) , Hanley, Kumar and Seguin (1993) , Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) , Benveniste, Erdal, and Wilhelm (1998), and Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan (2001) .
them immediately in the aftermarket. 3 Investors who sell their shares in the first few days after trading begins are referred to as flippers and investment banks have implemented schemes to discourage flipping because this activity puts downward pressure on the stock price. Flipping is the term used when shares are sold in the immediate aftermarket by investors who receive an initial allocation at the offer price and does not include purchases in the aftermarket. The lead underwriter does not disclose the proportion of shares allocated to institutions versus individuals, and the public does not know who has flipped shares. However, the lead underwriter and each syndicate member maintain a detailed account of initial allocations and each customer's flipping activity.
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal reported, "Traditionally, individuals get between 10% and 20% of IPO shares at the offer price" (Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2000, p. C21) . Another article reported that 60% of the IPO of AT&T Wireless Group was allocated to institutions and 40% was allocated to retail customers (including a large allocation to employees):
Trading volume was high: More than 137.4 million shares changed hands on the Big Board, making it the most active stock on the exchange. That indicates that many institutional investors who received shares on the offering were immediately "flipping" them to cash in. (Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2000, p. C19) In the case of the Goldman Sachs IPO in May 1999, the shares reportedly were placed "with a group of institutional investors and rich individuals who Goldman believed would remain loyal, long-term holders and not flip the stock after its offering" (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1999, p. 3 See Smith (1986) for an overview of the capital raising process and the role of underwriters. Sherman (2000) and Sherman and Titman (2002) discuss the book-building method used in IPOs.
C19). Even then trading volume was heavy on the first day, and the financial press concluded that this was due to trading by individuals.
I use a unique data set that permits a comprehensive empirical analysis of the flipping activities of investors after adjusting for allocations made to institutional and retail customers.
The perception that heavy trading volume during the first few days of trading in an IPO is due to flippers is not found to be true. I conclude that during the first few trading days, even though trading volume as a percentage of shares offered is high (mean of 81.97% and median of 74.10%), high trading volume is not just due to flipping. On average, flipping accounts for 18.95% (median of 16.67%) of trading volume and 15.00% (median of 7.34%) of shares offered in the IPO. Therefore, the high trading volume is partly a result of other factors, such as buying and selling by investors who are not necessarily original buyers of the IPO, and partly a result of trading activity between market makers. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) and Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) document the important role of market makers, particularly wholesalers, who are dealers/market makers for Nasdaq IPOs and receive payment for order flow. These wholesalers are not original investors in IPOs but are major intraday traders who might conduct several transactions (including taking short positions) in order to satisfy each customer's order and thereby add to trading volume. Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) discuss in detail the equity lending market in IPOs and document significant short selling activities in the first few days of trading.
It has generally been argued that large proportions of an IPO are allocated to institutional investors, the so-called "strong hands," because they are long-term investors and will not flip In the model developed by Fishe (2002) and Boehmer and Fishe (2000) , underpricing is necessary for aftermarket liquidity. They argue that underpricing induces flipping and that aftermarket trading produces revenue for the underwriter. Underpricing reduces gross spread income but increases profits from the market-making function. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) use a proxy to determine seller-initiated block trades (10,000 shares or more) to empirically measure the extent of flipping. Based on their proxy, they find that flipping accounts for 45% of trading volume on the first day of trading for cold IPOs and 22% for hot IPOs. My proportions are much lower than theirs. First, it is possible that seller-initiated block trades are not correctly identified by their algorithm, and it is also possible that all seller-initiated trades are not due to flipping. They also make an adjustment to reflect double counting in the case of Nasdaq volume. Their cutoff size is 10,000 and 5,000 shares, but I find that the average size of institutional flips is less than that.. It is possible that institutions split their orders into smaller sizes in order to reduce the price impact. I particularly find this to be true for hot IPOs. In hot IPOs, each institution gets only a small proportion of the allocation requested and this can also contribute to the small transaction size of each trade. Field (1995) finds large variations in institutional holdings of IPOs several months after the offering. My results demonstrate that because there are variations in IPO allocations and in the amount of flipping activity, the findings of Field (1995) and of Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) documenting that institutions are allocated similar proportions of both weak and strong offerings are not inconsistent. Institutions may be initially allocated similar percentages in most IPOs but after six months their ownership can be different due to the larger proportion of flipping in very hot IPOs. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that investment banks favor allocating shares to informed investors in order to induce them to reveal their private information. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find that higher allocations are given to those institutional investors who participate regularly and to those who provide more information (for example, a limit price).
The winner's curse model proposed by Rock (1986) predicts that informed investors are allocated a larger proportion of underpriced IPOs. Brennan and Franks (1997) suggest that allocation is done to ensure dispersed ownership. However, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue that allocating shares to large blockholders helps to increase firm value. Aggarwal and Dahiya (2000) also argue that institutional participation is necessary for an IPO to be successful. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) find that institutions are allocated almost two-thirds of an offering.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the process used by underwriters to allocate shares and the procedures by which they track flipping activity. Section 3 describes the details of the allocation and flipping data, along with the sources for other data used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings, and Section 5 provides a summary.
Process of allocations and flipping
Underwriters perform a number of functions in the IPO process. They initially start by doing due diligence and examining every aspect of the issuing company. The underwriter also arranges the road show, after which the offering is priced. The book-building procedure is used System are minimal and do not depend on the length of the tracking period.) In such cases, penalty bids might not be imposed, but investment banks like to collect the information for future use. If a customer has positions in the same security purchased in both an IPO and in the secondary market, then shares from the secondary market purchase are used to complete delivery first and are not considered flipped. The DTC IPO Tracking System allows monitoring in a book-entry method and also eliminates the need to distribute physical certificates. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the system reasoning that it should "further aid in the efficiencies of the clearance and settlement system because the IPO Tracking System should reduce costs, risks, and delays associated with the physical delivery of certificates (SEC Release No. 34-37208, May 13, 1996) .
Data
I used the Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issues database to identify all IPOs that took place during the period May 1997 to June 1998. SEC data on allocation and flipping from the lead underwriter are available only for this period. This proprietary information is not automatically submitted to the SEC but is maintained by the lead investment bank. For the purpose of this study, the recordswere requested from nine large and small investment banks for all issues in which they were a lead manager.
A total of 617 IPOs were issued during the period May 1997 to June 1998. The nine investment banks included in the sample took 193 of 617 companies public during the sample period. As shown in Table I , these offerings were bigger in size than the population of all IPOs, with a median offer price of $15 and a median issue size of $64.40 million. The median offer price and proceeds are $12 million and $36 million, respectively, for the full sample. Because our sample consists of larger IPOs, the average gross spread is lower, although the median gross spread of 7% is equal for both groups. The initial median return of 12.50% is also higher than that of the full sample, 8.98%.
For each offering, the data include both the allocation of shares between retail and institutional clients and information on the flipping activity of retail and institutional investors.
Therefore, we know how many retail and institutional clients who originally bought shares then sold them in the aftermarket during the first 30 days. This information was provided only for the clients of the lead underwriter because each syndicate member (including the lead underwriter) gets customer-level details only for its own customers. Therefore, the analysis on retail versus institutional flipping is based on the shares distributed by the lead underwriter. The lead underwriter receives an additional report showing the aggregate flipping activity for each syndicate member, but this does not include client-level details (for example, retail versus institutional customers).
The SDC database provides information on offer price, offer date, offer size, number of shares issued, and underwriter compensation. Much of the data was also checked against the information directly provided by the lead manager for each offering. The data on the size of the overallotment exercised and the date when the option was exercised were obtained directly from the lead underwriter.
Empirical analysis

Allocations and flipping
I first examine trading volume during the first two trading days. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) show that (2002) and Field and Hanka (2002) show that early releases are rare.
It is generally believed that a large proportion of this high initial trading volume is due to flippers, but because of the lack of data, no one has been able to determine the proportion of this volume that is the direct result of flipping. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) Similar to findings in Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) , the proportion of IPO shares allocated to institutions, on average, is 73.33% (median of 74.66%) for my sample. The members of the syndicate sell and distribute shares in an IPO. As discussed by Chen and Ritter (2000) , 60% of the gross spread is normally a selling concession. Members of the selling syndicate receive this selling concession based on the number of shares they sell. However, the lead underwriter itself sells a large percentage of the shares and hence keeps the selling concession for these shares.
Under a penalty bid arrangement, the lead underwriter can take away the selling concession from syndicate members for shares flipped by their clients. I find that, on average, the lead underwriter sells 62.47% of the offering. The lead underwriter, on average, allocates 81.86% of its shares (median of 84.49%) to institutions.
Filing range and flipping activity
There are large variations in flipping activity among IPO groups classified by final offer price relative to the filing range, as shown in Fig. 1 Next, for the first time we are able to examine the extent of flipping by institutional and retail customers and relate it to the number of shares actually allocated to each group. In Table   3 , the flipping activity of retail customers and institutions is grouped according to whether the IPO's final price is below the filing range, within the filing range, or above the filing range.
Three variables are estimated for both institutions and retail customers: shares flipped as a percentage of shares allocated, shares flipped as a percentage of total shares traded, and shares flipped as a percentage of total shares offered. This analysis is based on the shares distributed by the lead underwriter. As noted previously, the lead underwriter distributes, on average, 63% of the total shares.
There are three main results from this analysis: (1) Institutions flip more than retail customers; 2) the largest proportion of shares flipped by both institutions and retail customers is for IPOs priced above the filing range; and (3) the transaction size of shares flipped, measured by the average number of shares in a transaction, is larger for institutions than for retail customers, but lower than previously assumed.
Institutions flip a larger percentage of shares allocated to them than do individuals, as reported in Institutional flipping accounts for a much larger percentage of trading volume (mean of 15% to 20%) than retail flipping (mean of 2% to 6%). The same pattern holds true using the third On average, allocation to institutions is lowest for the group priced below the filing range at 67.51% and highest for the group of IPOs priced above the filing range at 75.21%. This is consistent with the book-building argument of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Cornelli and Goldreich (2002) 
Aftermarket price performance and flipping activity
The sample is split into four categories classified as very cold, cold, warm, and very hot.
There are 36 very cold IPOs with raw returns on day 1 of zero percent or less. Fifty IPOs are considered as cold because their day 1 return is greater than zero percent but less than or equal to 10%, 93 IPOs are classified as warm with day 1 returns between 10% and 60%, and 14 IPOs are considered very hot with day 1 returns greater than 60%. I also did the analysis using other cutoffs, but these cutoffs are consistent with previous literature (see Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 1999) .
Volume turnover for the first two days increases monotonically based on the aftermarket price performance categories. As shown in Fig. 2 and Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996) suggest that stabilization activities benefit institutional investors, but Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) In order to address the issue of whether institutions are smart and flip more of the weak IPOs to benefit from the underwriter's price support activities, I next examine the level of flipping activity by institutions and retail customers separately. If institutions are truly strong hands and invest for the long term, then we should find less flipping by institutions. This is the first time in the literature that the question is being answered empirically using actual data and not proxies for flipping and for institutional versus retail flipping. I am also able to directly connect flipping activity to actual share allocations to institutional investors. Table 5 retail customers in each transaction is much lower. These results suggest that using only block trades of 10,000 shares or even 5,000 shares does not capture a large proportion of flipping activity. Even when institutions have a large block to trade, they might split it into smaller transactions in order to minimize market impact. In the case of very hot IPOs, it is also possible that each institution is allocated fewer shares, so they have fewer shares to sell and the transaction size is smaller. For weak offerings, it is known that the underwriter is stabilizing the deal; therefore, even large blocks might not have a large impact on price.
Total institutional allocation varies from a low of 69.70% for very cold IPOs to a high of 76.12% for very hot IPOs. The differences are less pronounced than those based on filing price range. Therefore, there is little support for reports in the popular press suggesting that higher proportions of very hot IPOs are sold to institutions. Institutions do get the bulk of an IPO, but that tends to be the case for all offerings. These results are in contrast to earlier results based on grouping by final offer price relative to filing range. Underwriters allocate larger proportions of IPOs priced above the filing range to institutions, with the understanding that institutions will also help out with weak offerings.
The underwriter typically has 30 to 45 days to exercise the overallotment, and the exercise of this option determines the total number of shares outstanding. This can in turn affect the price performance and volume of trading in an IPO. In very hot IPOs, the Green Shoe is exercised to the maximum of 15% with the option being exercised in two to three days, on average. In very hot IPOs, more shares are outstanding because of the exercise of the Green Shoe and this can add to trading volume.
Type of lead underwriter, allocations, and flipping activity
Conversations with investment banks revealed that banks with large retail operations often manage offerings during weak market conditions or offerings that are expected to be hard to distribute. Some of the nine investment banks in my sample have a major retail brokerage operation. For the purpose of this study, I group them together and call them retail banks. All others are grouped into a second category called non-retail banks. The allocation and flipping activity based on this classification is presented in Table 6 . The size of IPOs (as measured by proceeds) handled by retail banks is larger than that of IPOs handled by non-retail banks, but the difference in means is not statistically significant. IPOs handled by retail banks have a first-day return of 14.82% (median of 11.18%) compared with returns of 20.45% (median of 13.54%) for
IPOs handled by non-retail banks. The differences in these returns are not statistically significant.
Retail banks allocate a significantly lower proportion of an IPO to institutions, with a mean of 63.07%, as compared to non-retail banks, which allocate 75.94% to institutions on average. The lead underwriter in the case of the retail bank group sells a significantly smaller percentage of the offering itself (58.15%) than is the case in the non-retail bank group (63.63%). 
Exchange, allocations, and flipping activity
In Table 7 the allocation and flipping analysis is presented done by listing exchange.
There are 122 IPOs on Nasdaq and 71 on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange (NYSE/AMEX). Nasdaq IPOs are smaller as measured by issue size and offer price.
They also have higher initial returns at 23.98%, compared with 10.89% for NYSE/AMEX IPOs.
Volume turnover of Nasdaq IPOs is almost double that of NYSE/AMEX IPOs and could be attributable to two factors that cannot be easily separated. The high volume of Nasdaq could be due to high initial returns or to double counting. However, flipping measured by shares flipped as a percentage of shares offered is independent of the volume bias and is higher on Nasdaq.
Institutions are allocated more of the better-performing Nasdaq IPOs than NYSE/AMEX IPOs.
Regression results for flipping
I ran two sets of regressions; the dependent variable in the first set is shares flipped by institutions as a percentage of shares allocated to institutions, and in the second set it is retail flipping as a percentage of shares allocated to retail customers. The independent variables are the percentage day 1 return (offer price to day 1 close), the percentage of the Green Shoe exercised, the log of proceeds, a dummy variable equal to one if the lead underwriter has a major retail brokerage operation and zero otherwise, and a dummy equal to one if the IPO trades on NYSE/AMEX and zero otherwise. Table 8 
Trading volume in IPOs
The paper has documented that flipping, on average, accounts only for a small proportion of the high trading volume observed in the IPO aftermarket. It removes the misperception that the high trading volume is mainly due to flippers. However, the results raise several questions to be tackled by future research. If flipping is not the major contributor to trading volume then we 
Summary
This paper attempts to address the following unresolved issues in the IPO literature: Consistent with the previous literature, I find initial trading volume to be high in IPOs.
On average, however, flipping accounts for only a small proportion of this trading volume.
Flipping does make up a large proportion of the volume in cold IPOs relative to hot IPOs, but this is due to the low total trading volume in cold IPOs rather than due to more flipping, as becomes clear by analyzing other, more accurate measures of flipping. I do find flipping to be relatively high in very hot IPOs. Penalty bids are assessed in only 13% of all offerings and amount to a small percentage of the total spread. However, penalties do not need to be assessed explicitly; just their threat and the threat of reduced allocations in the future can deter flipping and this can result in less flipping of cold IPOs.
Institutions consistently flip a larger proportion of shares allocated to them than do retail customers. This result does not lend support to the hypothesis that institutions are strong hands that hold onto their shares for the long term and are therefore favored in the allocation process.
Both institutions and retail customers flip a much larger percentage of their allocations in very hot IPOs than in cold IPOs. This finding does not support the hypothesis that institutions are smart investors who quickly get out of weak offerings that are still being supported by the underwriter.
The median transaction size of each institutional flip is 2,483 and 1,677 shares for warm and very hot IPOs, respectively. Institutions potentially split their orders into smaller sizes in order to reduce the impact on market price. Transaction size is higher for cold IPOs. In hot IPOs, each institution obtains a smaller allocation than in cold offerings, which could also lower the transaction size. There is considerable interest in a better understanding of the IPO process including allocation practices, pricing, stabilization, and aftermarket activities. I hope that the findings of this paper will trigger future research into several unanswered questions with regard to aftermarket activities and trading in IPOs.
Figure 1 Trading volume and flipping activity by filing range
The three variables plotted are the total number of shares flipped during the first two trading days as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO, total number of shares flipped in the first two trading days as a percentage of total number of shares traded in the first two trading days, and total number of shares traded in the first two trading days as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO. IPOs are classified based on whether the final offer price is below, above, or within the amended filing range. The three variables plotted are the total number of shares flipped during the first two trading days as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO, total number of shares flipped in the first two trading days as a percentage of total number of shares traded in the first two trading days, and total number of shares traded in the first two trading days as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO. Very hot IPOs are defined to have day 1 returns (offer price to day 1 close) greater than 60%, warm IPOs have returns between 10% and 60%, cold IPOs have returns between 0% and 10%, and very cold IPOs have returns less than or equal to zero percent. shares traded as % of total shares offered is the total number of shares traded in the first two days as a percentage of total shares offered; shares flipped as % of the total trading volume is the total number of shares flipped on the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares traded on the first two trading days; shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped on the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO; institutional allocation is the percentage of an issue allocated to institutional investors; lead UW's % of the offering is the percentage of shares in the offering distributed by the lead underwriter; and lead UW's institutional allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to institutions from the lead underwriter's quota. Table 2 Flipping activity by filing range
Below
Very
The sample of IPOs is split in three groups based on whether the final offer price was above, within, or below the amended filing range. Shares traded as % of total shares offered is the total number of shares traded in the first two days as a percentage of total shares offered; shares flipped as % of the total trading volume is the total number of shares flipped on the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares traded on the first two trading days; and shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped on the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO.
Below filing range (N=25)
Within filing range (N=120) Table 3 Institutional versus individual allocation and flipping by filing range
The table shows flipping activity (based on the first two trading days) by institutions and individual customers partitioned by whether the final offer price was above, within, or below the amended filing range. Shares flipped as % of shares allocated is the total number of shares flipped by institutions (retail investors) divided by the total number of shares allocated to institutions (retail) in the IPO; shares flipped as % of shares traded is the total number of shares flipped by institutions (retail ) divided by the total number of shares traded; shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped by institutions (retail) divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO; average size of institutional (retail) flip is the average number of shares flipped in each flipping transaction; institutional allocation is the percentage of an issue allocated to institutional investors; lead UW's % of the offering is the percentage of shares in the offering distributed by the lead underwriter; and lead UW's institutional allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to institutions from the lead underwriter's quota.
Within filing range (N=120) Table 4 Flipping activity by initial returns
The sample of IPOs is split in four groups based on day 1 returns (offer price to day 1 close): very cold, cold, warm, and very hot. Shares traded as % of total shares offered is the total number of shares traded during the first two days as a percentage of total shares offered; shares flipped as % of the total trading volume is the total number of shares flipped during the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares traded during the first two trading days; and shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped during the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO. Table 5 Institutional versus retail flipping by initial returns
The table shows flipping activity (based on the first two trading days) by institutions and retail customers who were initially allocated shares in the offering. Mean and median values are reported for each variable. Shares flipped as % of shares allocated is the total number of shares flipped by institutions (retail investors) divided by the total number of shares allocated to institutions (retail) in the IPO; shares flipped as % of shares traded is the total number of shares flipped by institutions (retail customers) divided by the total number of shares traded; shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped by institutions (retail) divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO; average size of institutional (retail) flip is the average number of shares flipped in each flipping transaction; institutional allocation is the percentage of an issue allocated to institutional investors; lead UW's % of the offering is the percentage of shares in the offering distributed by the lead underwriter; lead UW's institutional allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to institutions from the lead underwriter's quota; Green Shoe exercised is the percentage of the overallotment exercised (maximum is 15%); and days to exercise the Green Shoe is the number of days taken by the lead underwriter to exercise the option (typical maximum is 45 days). Table 6 Allocation and flipping by type of lead underwriter
The sample of IPOs is split into two groups based on the type of lead underwriter: retail and non-retail. The lead investment bank is defined to be retail if it has a major retail brokerage operation, otherwise it is non-retail. The table provides mean and median statistics: N is the number of observations; offer price is the initial offer price; issue size refers to the dollar proceeds; gross spread is the underwriter spread as a percentage of offer price; day 1 return is the percentage difference between the opening price on day 1 and the offer price; shares traded as % of total shares offered is the total number of shares traded during the first two days as a percentage of total shares offered; shares flipped as % of the total trading volume is the total number of shares flipped during the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares traded during the first two trading days; and shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped during the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO; institutional allocation is the percentage of an issue allocated to institutional investors; lead UW's % of the offering is the percentage of shares in the offering distributed by the lead underwriter; and lead UW's institutional allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to institutions from the lead underwriter's quota.
* indicates significant difference from zero at the 5% level, assuming normality and independence
Retail banks (N=44)
Non-retail banks (N=149) Table 7 Allocation and flipping by exchange
Difference in means
The sample of IPOs is split into two groups based on the listing exchange. The table provides mean and median statistics: N is the number of observations; offer price is the initial offer price; issue size refers to the dollar proceeds; gross spread is the underwriter spread as a percentage of offer price; day 1 return is the percentage difference between the opening price on day 1 and the offer price; shares traded as % of total shares offered is the total number of shares traded in the first two days as a percentage of total shares offered; shares flipped as % of the total trading volume is the total number of shares flipped on the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares traded on the first two trading days; and shares flipped as % of shares offered is the total number of shares flipped on the first two trading days divided by the total number of shares offered in the IPO; institutional allocation is the percentage of an issue allocated to institutional investors; lead UW's % of the offering is the percentage of shares in the offering distributed by the lead underwriter; and lead UW's institutional allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to institutions from the lead underwriter's quota. * indicates significant difference from zero at the 5% level, assuming normality and independence Two sets of regressions are run. The first set uses shares flipped by institutions as a percentage of shares allocated to institutions as the dependent variable, and the second set shares flipped by retail customers as a percentage of shares allocated to retail customers. The independent variables are the day 1 return (offer price to day 1 close), Green Shoe percentage exercised, log of initial proceeds, a dummy variable equal to one if the lead investment bank is classified as retail and zero otherwise, and a dummy equal to one if the IPO trades on NYSE/AMEX and zero otherwise.
Nasdaq
* indicates significant difference from zero at the 5 % level, assuming normality and independence ** indicates significant difference from zero at the 10 % level, assuming normality and independence
Dependent variable
Institutional flipping as % of shares allocated 
